Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Master's Theses (2009 -)

Dissertations, Theses, and Professional
Projects

Using Grids as Password Entry Devices
Karol Lejmbach
Marquette University

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Lejmbach, Karol, "Using Grids as Password Entry Devices" (2021). Master's Theses (2009 -). 648.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/648

USING GRIDS AS PASSWORD ENTRY DEVICES

by
Karol Lejmbach, B.S.

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,
Marquette University,
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
May 2021

ABSTRACT
USING GRIDS AS PASSWORD ENTRY DEVICES

Karol Lejmbach, B.S.
Marquette University, 2021

The classic text-based password has been around for a very long time. A lot of
security research has been conducted on it. A set of best practices has been available for
many years stressing the use of longer and more complex passwords. The issue with this
approach is that humans have a hard time recalling long complex sequences of characters.
Worse, the more complex the string of characters the more prone it is to being written
down which is the most detrimental security threat.
The goal of this paper is to introduce and provide an introductory analysis of a
grid-based password system. This system allows weaker passwords to still have the
potential security of longer more complex passwords. At the same time the system
leverages the human ability to better recall visual patterns to aid in the memorization
process. This thesis will discuss the mathematical maxima that may be achieved by using
this password system. Compare it against conventional graphical passwords, and finally
discuss the human factor in using this password schema.
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1
Introduction

It is a well-documented fact that people choose easy to remember passwords. The
research that has analyzed this property points to a few reasons for this. One of the
reasons is the number of accounts people have, in the paper by Rick Wash et al. they
observed users authenticating around 3.2 times per day (Rick Wash et al. 1-10). Since
authentication is a requirement for completing a task for many people, choosing weaker
passwords means less time is spent on the authentication process (Rick Wash et al. 1-10).
The other burden of having so many accounts is password reuse between the accounts.
In the research conducted by Rick Wash et al. they found that majority of reused
passwords were more complex and were used frequently. One potential solution to this
problem is using password managers; however, only 26 participants said they used this
technology (Rick Wash et al. 1-10). During their research Rick Wash et al. found that the
average password length of their participants was around 9 characters.
With these facts in mind, a new user authentication system is being proposed that
uses a grid of cells into which the user enters their password. Each character that makes
up the user password will appear somewhere in the grid provided. The system will then
authenticate the user based on if the characters match and if they were entered in the
correct order into the grid.
There will be to forms of analysis run on this system. A mathematical analysis
that will look to see the gains over conventional text-based passwords. As well as a
human factors analysis that will look to see how these mathematical gains are reflected in
the real world. The main focus will be to see if there is sufficient variation in how the
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grid is used to warrant further research and eventual adoption of the new password
system.

3
Literature Review

The main problem with text-based passwords is human memory. In the research
done by Inglesant and Sasse people tended to create passwords based on objects found
around them; the main goal being to facilitate the recollection of passwords as needed
(qtd. in Rick Wash et al. 1-10). In the research done by Stobert and Kibble people tend to
save login credentials to their browsers; however, this practice is still less common than
memorizing passwords (qtd. in Rick Wash et al. 1-10). Reliance on memory has other
implications.
Passwords that are easy to remember are less complex; moreover, a password that
was created in accordance with password policies is still relatively simple (Rick Wash et
al. 1-10). This was observed in the research led by Ur’s team where the respondents did
not fully understand how to increase password complexity (qtd. in Rick Wash et al. 110). Ideally people should use password managers to handle passwords; however, the
adoption of these tools is very low even saving passwords to browser is not as widely
used as memorizing passwords (Rick Wash et al. 1-10). Other password schemes have
been developed that try to account for human reliance on memory, one such password
scheme is Draw a Secret.
Draw a Secret, DaS, technology has been around for quite some time. It has been
employed in many authentication processes from drawing a pattern on a PDA screen to
altering an image. One of the advantages of using this form of password authentication is
that it leverages the human ability to remember patterns. Today, one of the most
commonly encountered forms of DaS is the android swipe pattern that utilizes a grid of
nodes.
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This grid is used to store a continuous path connecting the nodes that is used to
authenticate the user. Security analysis that has been performed on the merit of this
authentication scheme has yielded interesting results that in some respects will also be
reflected in the grid scheme being proposed in this thesis.
One of the first criticism of the Android swipe pattern is that the default grid is
too small. The pattern also must meet specific criteria to be valid. Such pattern consists of
at least 4 nodes, all nodes can only be used once, the pattern must be continuous, and
finally if a path traces over a node that node is automatically included in the pattern
(Aviv, Budzitowski, & Kuber, Dec 7, 2015). Considering these constraints there is a
maximum of 389,112 possible patterns; this means that a 3x3 grid has the same
magnitude of complexity as a 4-character password that uses all printable symbols (Aviv
et al., Dec 7, 2015). These observations do not translate favorably once human factors are
added.
In the process of researching this topic two most relevant papers were chosen that
analyze the Android swipe pattern in varying degrees. The paper “Complexity Metrics
and User Strength Perceptions of the Pattern-Lock Graphical Authentication Method” by
Panagiotis Andriotis et al. focuses primarily on the current 3x3 grid present on Android
devices. Their paper presents the continuation and further analysis of the initial pilot
study done by Panagiotis.
The majority of their research is conducted through an Android app that is
published on the play store and asks respondents to submit an Android swipe pattern and
answer a few demographic questions about themselves. The app then provides feedback
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regarding the complexity of the submitted pattern and offers the opportunity to submit a
different pattern.
The complexity of the pattern is calculated by looking at the number of
occurrences of what they call knight moves, following the pattern that the knight piece
moves in chess, which happen when a user jumps to a node that is diagonally positioned
from the previous node. The presence of an overlapping node which is a node that is hit
once then jumped across to continue the pattern further.
The next part of the metric is the length, number of nodes used, which only
contributes to the scored if a length of over 5 nodes was submitted. Because of the length
constraints placed on the pattern, there will be at least one direction change on a 3x3 grid.
The complexity score is increased by one if the pattern submitted has more than one
direction change.
The last pattern characteristic that is considered for the complexity score is the
starting location of the pattern. If the pattern starts in the upper-left hand node, then there
is no contribution to the score. These values are then summed and a verdict of weak,
medium, and strong are assigned given the presence of the aforementioned characteristics
of the submitted pattern.
The results described in their research reflect the results present in the pilot study
done by Panagiotis Andriotis et al which was published in the sixth ACM conference
(Andriotis et al., 2014). During the analysis of the patterns, a list of most common
sequences of nodes that appear in longer patterns was created.
These sub-patterns consisted of binary, ternary, and quartic node patterns. The
presence of these patterns can be leveraged when building patterns that mimic how
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people navigate grids. Looking at the lengths of the patterns submitted, the majority fall
in the five to seven node range. The upper half yielding an extra point in the complexity
calculation being over six nodes long. The results gathered by Androitis et al. show that
the most popular starting node was the one in the upper-left hand corner.
Interestingly, majority of the patterns submitted were classified as medium or
strong. I would argue that given the way of calculating the complexity metric this does
not provide much feedback on what is really happening; nevertheless, there is a tendency
to generate stronger patterns with 88 submissions falling in the medium and strong
classification (Andriotis et al., 2014). This is in stark contrast to the findings gathered by
Rick Walsh where there was a tendency for choosing weaker passwords (Rick Wash et
al. 1-10).
The second paper, “Is Bigger Better? Comparing User-Generated Passwords on
3x3 vs. 4x4 Grid sizes for Android’s Pattern Lock” written by Adam J. Aviv et al. dives
deeper into the topics present Andriotis’ et al. research. Their research focuses on
analyzing the benefits of increasing the grid size to a 4x4. At the same time, Aviv et al.
provide a much more robust method of assigning a strength metric to a submitted swipe
pattern.
The first form of data collection done by Aviv et al. was a pen-and-paper
experiment. The goal of this experiment was to generate patterns and at the same time
replicate the results published by Uellenbeck et al. The process would ask the participant
to fill out a total of six defensive patterns three for the 3x3 grid as well as for the 4x4
grid. Next the participant would fill out ten offensive patterns as well as a demographic
survey.
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Aviv et al. define defensive patterns as those owned and created by a respondent;
an offensive pattern would be a pattern that the respondent creates as a guess of someone
else’s pattern (Aviv et al., Dec 7, 2015). At the end of the session, they would be asked to
reproduce their original defensive patterns rewarding those participants that successfully
recalled their original patterns. The second form of data collection that they performed
was by gathering 3x3 patterns from a website utilizing Amazon’s Turk to generate the
data.
Andriotis et al. define embeds as inscribing a 3x3 pattern into a 4x4 grid. During
their analysis of the pen and paper experiment they found that 33% of the 4x4 patterns
generated were embeds of 3x3 patterns (Aviv et al., Dec 7, 2015). Symmetries on the
other hand are patterns that can be reproduced by rotating or reflecting a pervious pattern.
The inclusion of these two metrics in the evaluation of the strength of a pattern is critical
because these can be leveraged by guessers to accelerate the cracking process of patterns.
Another metric that was employed was guessability. Guessability looks at how easy it is
to generate a pattern by randomly connecting nodes together.
Looking at the results present in the paper by Aviv et al. the introduction of
another row and column has little impact on the starting and ending positions of patterns.
Also, their findings replicated those that were done by Andriotis et al. With the majority
of the patterns starting in the upper-left hand corner and terminating in the bottom-right.
Since both offensive and defensive patterns were collected from the pen-and-paper
respondents, there were significantly less correct guesses of 4x4 patterns compared to
3x3 patterns. It is noted by the researchers that these results may be inflated because of
the fact that a single guess would compromise multiple defensive patterns. The most
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important part of the results is looking at the recollection rate of the 4x4 pattern
compared to the 3x3 pattern were very comparable with the 4x4 grid being only 5%
behind in correct recollection to the 3x3 grid.
With these findings the researchers began developing a brute force algorithm that
would be run on the patterns gathered from both the online submission and the pen-andpaper experiment. The primary design goal of the algorithm was to maximize the speed
of cracking by exploiting and targeting the characteristics such as embeds and
symmetries in patterns. The design of the algorithm followed Markov’s Model
Likelihood Estimates. This model would build patterns based on probabilities of nodes
being connected by an edge. There was a modification introduced into the Markov’s
Model that would also account for the probability of the length of the pattern being
generated which would be multiplied to the probability generated by Markov’s Model.
With this brute force algorithm in place the researchers began assigning strength
metrics to the submitted patterns based on their guessability. This is a much better
approach compared to the one presented in the previous paper, providing a much more
exacting analysis of the pattern, and yielding more useful feedback about the pattern.
The results of applying the cracking algorithm show the massive improvement
resulting from increasing of the grid size to 4x4. With the total number of guessed
patterns dropping to below 40% after 10,000 attempted guesses; compared to over 80%
being cracked by that point on the 3x3 grid. The other important finding present here is
that offensive patterns are much weaker than defensive patterns. This could be justified
by the fact that people guess common patterns or simpler patterns when trying to guess
an unknown pattern.
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The password entry device being proposed in this work can be considered a
variant of the Android Swipe pattern. The main difference being is that there is no longer
a binary system of either using a node or not using a node. The cells, nodes, can be used
as often as the user wishes. At the same time, other constraints such as: the pattern
requiring at least four nodes, there can be no reuse of previous nodes, the pattern being
drawn in one stroke, and not avoiding previously un-selected nodes are not enforced
(Aviv et al., Dec 7, 2015). Since these constraints are not being adopted in the new
password schema, many more possible paths through the grid will have to be considered
increasing the complexity and slowing down the brute force attack. The biggest
contribution of these two papers is the analysis of how grids are navigated by humans
which is something that will need to be considered in the new system being proposed.
The demonstration of the attack results provides an invaluable way of further
analyzing and testing the grid password system. Being able to remove some of the
inherent limitations and simplifications of the pattern system will undoubtedly make it
harder for attacks to take place. At the same time understanding the limitations
introduced by symmetries and embeds may be used to create password policies that
mitigate the risks introduced by their presence.
Considering the findings of the two papers there is clear evidence that combining
text-based passwords with the recollection benefits of Draw a Secret will allow an
additional level of security when users have weaker passwords that are easier to
remember. There is strong potential in building upon the swipe pattern using the gridbased system and provide an additional level of complexity that mitigates the risks of
short passwords.
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The scheme being introduced will be more involved than a simple swipe pattern
that is employed on Android devices. Questions regarding the human ability to recall
their passwords will have to be addressed. The article “Working Memory Training:
Assessing the Efficiency of Mnemonic Strategies” written by Di Santo et al. looks at
memory training and compares how the trainings impact the ability of humans to improve
their working memory. The part that is most relevant to this research is looking at the
differences between sequential memorization and grid-based memorization.
The experiment conducted by Di Santo et al. separated a group of forty-three
participants into a control and experimental group. Both groups would perform the same
tasks meant to exercise their working memory. These tasks included: N-Back task,
seminar, and a memory test. The main difference between the control and the
experimental group was in the seminar. The experimental group were given a seminar on
how to improve their working memory whilst the control group were given a seminar on
memory. After the seminar both groups were given a three-hour break after which the
memory tests were administered.
The memory test consisted of five pieces: word sequence, image sequence, digits,
word grid, image grid. During all these tests the people had to commit to memory at their
own pace the information being presented. The main difference being that the
experimental group could employ the tactics that were covered during their seminar while
the control group had to memorize the information in whatever way they knew. Some of
the outliers in the control group later told the researchers that they were taught similar
strategies as those that were taught to the experimental group which increased their
performance on the tests (Di Santo, De Luca, Isaja, & Andreetta, 2020).
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The results of the experiment show that there is improvement to using grids over
sequential memorization; the experimental group had the best scores with the fraction of
correct answers being between 80-100% (Di Santo et al., 2020). Comparing the results of
the control group looking at the experiment of sequential words to words presented in a
grid there is improvement with the sequential average being around 20% correct jumping
to an average of around 70% when the information was presented in a grid (Di Santo et
al., 2020). The group of researchers justify this spike in performance in the control group
as to the fact that grids can be used as visualizations making it easier to internalize
information versus creating a chain of information that is being presented in order. In the
end the performance gains in working memory demonstrate the potential that grids have
when it comes to remembering information.
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Mathematical Analysis

For an Android swipe pattern to be legal the following requirements must be met
(Aviv, Budzitowski, and Kuber 301-310):
•

The pattern must consist of at least 4 nodes

•

Nodes cannot be reused

•

The pattern must be continuous

•

Nodes cannot be skipped in the pattern. If the pattern line passes over a node, that
node is added to the pattern.

With these restrictions in place the maximum number of legal patterns available on a 3x3
grid is only 389,112 (Aviv, Budzitowski, and Kuber 301-310). By removing these
restrictions, the proposed password grid scheme will allow for more complex password
without necessarily increasing the length of the password needed to be memorized by the
user. At the same time, being able to provide basic protection when written down.
The new system introduces a grid into which the user enters their password by
placing characters present in their password into the cells of the grid. Once complete, the
system authenticates the user by checking: if the correct characters are present as well as
if they were entered into the grid in the correct position and order. Upon fulfilling these
two factors the user is granted access. The system does not have any requirements for
how the grid needs to be filled out; however, password policies can be introduced to
enforce specific levels of complexity as need be.
In order to maximize adoption of this system, current user password storing
solutions will be used. To accomplish this, as the user is entering the password into the
grid the computer is translating the input into a sequence of characters. For example:
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a,1,2 would mean that the letter “a” appears second in the first cell. The user only must
recall is that their password has the letter “a” appear in the first cell after another
character in that cell. Since the order in which the grid was filled out is preserved by the
sequence of characters and their ordered pairs, finding a grid written down somewhere
will not necessarily compromise the security because the order in which the characters
appear will have to be figured out. The presence of repeated characters in the password
can aid in disguising how the grid was filled out.

Figure I Password "HELLO" stored in a 2x2 grid.

Figure II Password "HELLO" stored in a 3x3 grid

Figure 1 demonstrates this property. The two L’s in HELLO do not automatically
yield a pattern in which the gird was filled out. Two possible passwords would need to be
tested one in which the “L” is entered after the “E” or the other case where it is entered
after the “E” in the upper-right hand corner. One of these passwords could be:
H,1,1,E,3,1,L,2,1,L,3,2,O,4,1. Entering the password left to right, top to bottom would
yield H,1,1,E,3,1,L,3,2,L,2,1,O,4,1 which clearly are not the same password. This means
that finding the order in which the Ls were entered is mandatory. The same can be
observed if the grid is large enough to not need cell reuse as shown in figure 2. These two
examples also demonstrate the feature that this new scheme has. Namely, knowing what
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characters make up the password may not be sufficient to gaining access to a user’s
account.
A list of potential text-based passwords is generated from a collection of available
characters. These lists can be adjusted according to password policies, but in the end the
maximum number of possible passwords, Mp, can be calculated using the following
equation.
𝐶 = 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑
𝑀𝑝 = 𝐶 𝑛
The practice of using more complex character sets can be justified by the fact that
increasing the cardinality of the character set creates many more potential passwords than
increasing the password length of the same character set.
For an eight-character lower-case letter password the calculation would be as
follows.
𝑀𝑝 = 268
𝑀𝑝 = 2.09 ∗ 1011
Increasing the password by one character the original value is multiplied by a factor of
26.
𝑀𝑝 = 269
𝑀𝑝 = 5.43 ∗ 1012
If a larger cardinality is chosen, then the number of potential passwords may have a
larger increase. For example, including upper-case letters will yield:
𝑀𝑝 = 528
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𝑀𝑝 = 5.35 ∗ 1013
In this case keeping the password the same length but introducing upper-case letters
yielded a result that is almost an order of magnitude larger than increasing the length of
the lower-case password by one.
This does not always hold true for example if instead of upper-case letters digits
0-9 were introduced then the following result would be obtained.
𝑀𝑝 = 368
𝑀𝑝 = 2.82 ∗ 1012
This value is smaller than the value obtained when the password was increased by one
lower-case letter.
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Table I Table that shows the number of potential passwords and at which point increasing the cardinality is better
than adding another letter.

Length of
password

26
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

3.1E+08
8.0E+09
2.1E+11
5.4E+12
1.4E+14
3.7E+15
9.5E+16
2.5E+18
6.5E+19
1.7E+21

36
6.0E+07
2.18E+09
7.84E+10
2.82E+12
1.02E+14
3.66E+15
1.32E+17
4.74E+18
1.71E+20
6.14E+21

The table shows at which point increasing the password length provides less
passwords than increasing the cardinality. The password length can be increased up to a
length of 11 characters yielding more passwords than keeping the same length and
increasing the cardinality. From that point going forward it is better to increase
cardinality than increasing the length of the password. As mentioned previously people
tend to choose shorter passwords this means that something has to be introduced to
increase the number of potential passwords that are shorter. This is where the password
grid comes into play. The idea being that by introducing a grid the number of potential
passwords is increased.
When the grid is introduced the equation for finding the maximum number of
potential passwords is multiplied by the number of ways there are to choose the cells
from the grid.
𝑀𝑝 = 𝐶 𝑛 ∗ (𝑛 + 𝑀 − 1 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑛)
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In this case the M stands for the number of available cells and the C and n preserve their
meaning from the original equation.
If the password set contains two letters for example A and B and a 2-cell grid is
provided for entering the password, then the maximum number of passwords will be
calculated as follows.
𝑀𝑝 = 22 ∗ (3 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 2)
𝑀𝑝 = 12
Writing out all the arrangements the following list can be created.

Table II Shows all possible arrangements for a two-letter password in a 2-cell grid.

AA|

BB|

AB|

BA|

A|A

B|B

A|B

B|A

|AA

|BB

|AB

|BA
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It is clear that the complexity introduced by filling out the grid has significant
improvements even on this very simple example. Looking at a similar table from the
previous regular passwords it can be seen the impact of a 9-cell grid and a 16-cell grid.

Table III Shows how many characters are needed to match or exceed the number of potential passwords available
from a 3x3 and 4x4 grid.

LowerWith 3x3
With 4x4
Length case
grid
grid
8 2.09E+11
2.69E+15
1.02E+17
9 5.43E+12
1.32E+17
7.10E+18
10 1.41E+14
6.18E+18
4.61E+20
11 3.67E+15
2.77E+20
2.84E+22
12 9.54E+16
1.20E+22
1.66E+24
13 2.48E+18
5.05E+23
9.29E+25
14 6.45E+19
2.06E+25
5.00E+27
15 1.68E+21
8.22E+26
2.60E+29
16 4.36E+22
3.21E+28
1.31E+31
17 1.13E+24
1.23E+30
6.41E+32
18 2.95E+25
4.61E+31
3.06E+34

In order to exceed the minimum number of passwords available with a 3x3 grid a lowercase character password with at least 11 characters would have to be chosen. At the same
time in order to match the 4x4 grid an additional two characters would have to be chosen.
This system can be thought of as an extension of the Android swipe pattern. In the
proposed system each node no longer stores a binary value reflecting its use in the
pattern. Instead, each cell can store any number of characters present in the password.
Next there is no requirement for how many cells must be used by the user. At the same
time, the pattern in which the grid is filled out does not have to be continuous, where
consecutive cells need to be adjacent. An example of this would be filling out the
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password using only the outside corners of the grid. These generalizations introduce new
levels of complexity that must be addressed when attempting to crack passwords.
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Human Factors Analysis

Mathematical complexity does not show the whole picture. Human tendencies can
severely impact the potential that any security system has. In order to analyze these
impacts, an IRB approved survey was performed to answer the following questions:
•

Does the respondent use a password manager?

•

How do they unlock their phone?

•

How would they fill out a grid with a predetermined password?

•

Where they see this password scheme being adopted?

Figure III Example of the invitation to the survey.

The survey was built in Qualtrics and an anonymous link was posted in group chats for
people to click on and fill out the survey. Figure III shows an example of one of the
recruitment messages sent along with the link to the survey. There were two posts
performed.
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The first link was posted in a group chat where CS college students would hang
out and discuss classes and topics. The second recruitment was posted on a group chat for
graduate students in the Computing program at Marquette. There was a total of 14
responses collected of which two were removed because of technical issues. Of the
remaining 12 one person chose to only submit the grids. The results of the survey reflect
some of the findings present in the research described by Andriotis et al. and Aviv et al.
In the survey only 50% of the respondents replied “yes” to using a password
manager. This is like the results gathered by Rick Wash et al. where 24% of their
participants claimed they used a password manager (Rick Wash et al. 1-10). These two
results reflect the fact that using password managers is not yet widely adopted. It is worth
noting that the research done by Rick Wash et al. was focused mainly on college students
outside of the computing and engineering fields (Rick Wash et al. 1-10). The next
question in the survey asked about how people unlock their phones.
18% of the respondents claimed they use a swipe pattern to unlock their phone.
36% of the respondents claimed that they used a pin. 27% claimed they use biometrics.
9% claimed they use a password. And finally, 9% claimed they do not use a lock on their
phone. Andriotis et al. had a similar question in their research but only asked for Pattern
Lock, Pin, and other. The results they got 53.3%, 39.2% and 7.5% respectively.
Adjusting the groupings to match those done by Andriotis et al., yields the following
results: 20%, 40%, and 40% excluding the one person that did not use a lock. It is
important to note that Andriotis et al. focused only on the android users gathering their
data using an Android app published on the Google App Store (Andriotis, Tryfonas, and
Oikonomou 115-126).
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Next came the first 4x4 grid into which the respondent had to place the password
“lazydog123” into. The reason for providing a 4x4 grid was to ensure that cell reuse was
optional. The instructions did make it clear that cells could be reused as well as one of the
examples provided along with the prompt also had cells reused. The results gathered
reflected the research done by both Andriotis et al. as well as Aviv et al. Figure IV shows
the results of the cells used by the respondents and during which time they were used.
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Figure IV Heat maps showing which cells were used most often and at what time.
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To better compare to the results gathered by Aviv et al. as well as Andriotis et al.
a cell was counted once even if multiple characters appeared in it. The results show that
there is a tendency for majority of the patterns to be around the upper-left hand corner at
the same time the use of the main diagonal, upper-left to bottom-right, can be observed in
the heatmaps. Looking at the results gathered by Aviv et al. there is a much higher
distribution of ending positions compared to their research where the bottom-right hand
node occurring 21% (Aviv, Budzitowski, and Kuber 301-310).
In their research Aviv et al. also discuss common patterns they call tri-grams and
quad-grams. Looking for those patterns in the defensive grid submissions it is hard to
find them. Some of the patterns submitted skip around the grid and do not necessarily
follow a distinct path.

Figure V Example of a more scrambled pattern

In Figure V it can be observed that the pattern starts in the upper-left hand corner then
jumps around filling in cells almost randomly.
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Figure VI Two different defensive submissions that match.

In the submissions two respondents provided the same defensive pattern. In both
cases a spiral pattern was chosen. Cell reuse was also not common in the defensive
patterns with only 42% of them having cell reuse. Another characteristic that was
observed was that some submissions modified the password “lazydog123” by changing
the characters.
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Figure VII Two submissions where the given password was altered.

Since the primary focus of the survey was to look at how the grid was filled out,
neither of these submissions were excluded.
One defining feature of the offensive submissions is that they are a lot less
random. Looking at the two heat maps there are much more distinct paths being followed
by the offensive guesses.

Table IV Comparing the heatmaps of defensive and offensive grid patterns.

1
2
3
4

Cells Used Defensive
A
B
C
D
91.7%
66.7%
66.7%
58.3%
58.3%
75.0%
58.3%
16.7%
58.3%
83.3%
66.7%
25.0%
41.7%
16.7%
25.0%
33.3%

1
2
3
4

Cells Used Offensive
A
B
C
D
91.7%
50.0%
41.7%
41.7%
41.7%
50.0%
25.0%
25.0%
33.3%
33.3%
41.7%
16.7%
41.7%
16.7%
16.7%
41.7%
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Figure VIII Example of how the pattern changes between a guess and a defensive pattern.
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Once again, two submissions guessed each other’s password. Both submissions
put the password in the upper-left hand corner.

Figure IX Two offensive patterns matching.

As mentioned before the goal was to look at patterns of the submission that is
why these two submissions are classified as a match, even though the password itself is
altered one using an uppercase letter the other using a lowercase letter. Another
interesting observation regarding the difference between the offensive and defensive
patterns is the starting location.
In almost all offensive patterns the upper-left hand corner was used with only one
submission using the lower-right hand corner. This is useful in demonstrating the
potential limitations of human tendencies to lowering the mathematical complexity to just
a few common patterns.
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Table V Heatmaps of the starting locations for the defensive and offensive patterns.

Starting Cell Defensive
A
B
C
D
1
58.3%
8.3%
8.3%
0.0%
2
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
3
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Starting Cell Offensive
A
B
C
D
1
91.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%

These results mirror the results gathered by Aviv et al. where 37.5% of the
patterns used the upper-left hand corner.
Interestingly the ending cell positions are much more scattered compared to the
results gathered by Aviv’s team. They had 21.6% of the patterns end in the lower-right
hand corner with the upper-right being the second most used with 14.3%.
Table VI Heat maps for the ending cell.

A
1
2
3
4

Ending Cell Defensive
B
C
D
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
16.7%
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
8.3%
16.7%
0.0%
8.3%
16.7%
0.0%

A
1
2
3
4

Ending Cell Offensive
B
C
D
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%

The main reason why this could be the case is that cells are allowed to be reused meaning
that the ending position of the pattern is harder to determine.
From all the results gathered it is clear that there is definite potential present in the
new password scheme and the aforementioned limitations caused by human tendencies to
fill out a grid are present; however, do not greatly impact the overall performance of the
grid.
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Table VII Heat map of all cells used.

A
1
2
3
4

All Cells Used
B
C
D
91.7%
58.3%
54.2%
50.0%
62.5%
41.7%
45.8%
58.3%
54.2%
41.7%
16.7%
20.8%

50.0%
20.8%
20.8%
37.5%

The use of the main diagonal as well as the first row and column can be seen;
however, there is a much larger spread of use across majority of the grid focused around
the upper-left hand side.
One could argue that using a 3x3 grid and inscribing it inside of the 4x4 grid
would make guessing easier. This strategy was looked at by Aviv et al.; however, in the
grid-based system cells can be reused and the cells do not have to be adjacent to each
other. This means that inscribing 3x3 grid patterns in a 4x4 grid will be less fruitful than
doing the same in an android swipe pattern grid.
Finally, looking at the results of where the respondent thinks this password
scheme could be used there was a tie for web login and computer login both with 50%.
This choice makes sense mainly from the easier input and navigation of using a keyboard
and mouse.
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Conclusion

The findings gathered in this preliminary research boost confidence in the
potential of this system. Further research must be performed using an actual
implementation of this password scheme. This would include implementing the login
system on computers and performing further analysis.
As part of the analysis, a set of best practices for grids would be created. These
would provide a foundation for password policies that could be implemented. The
policies would then be tested to see the impact they have the on the performance of the
grids. Time would also be devoted to guessing user passwords and analyzing the security
similarly to the analysis done by Aviv et al. where they assigned strength based on
guessability of the password. The influence of human factors will continue to be studied
as well.
One human factor that was analyzed only theoretically was the ability to recall
information stored in a grid. Having the users create their own patterns as well as
passwords could change what cells are used. At the same time, it is speculated, that the
new patterns could resemble the offensive patterns collected in this research. Being that
they are more organized and potentially easier to remember. Another human aspect that
would need further analysis is the impact of language on how the grid is filled in.
During the research it was speculated, but not tested, how the manor of filling in
the grid would change based on the native language of the user. This could be analyzed
by looking at the heat maps and seeing if the zone shifts from the upper-left hand corner
to the upper-right hand corner, if the system is used by people whose native language is
written right to left.
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The exploratory research into Grid Passwords has revealed that the system has
theoretical and practical potential. The results gathered provide a glimpse into what
should be explored further, and at the same time reflect the results gathered by other
groups conducting research on similar authentication systems. Focusing on human factors
will also be critical. Overall, the system has potential, and warrants further exploration
and implementation.
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